Ticket
pricing in public transport usually takes a welfare maximization point of view.
Such an approach, however, does not consider fairness in the sense that users
of a shared infrastructure should pay for the costs that they generate.
We
propose an ansatz to determine fair ticket prices that combines concepts from
cooperative game theory and linear and integer programming.
The
ticket pricing problem is considered to be a constrained cost allocation game,
which is a generalization of cost allocation games that allows to deal with
constraints on output prices and on the formation of coalitions.
An
application to pricing railway tickets for the intercity network of the
Netherlands is presented. The results demonstrate that the fairness of prices
can be improved substantially in this way.
Title:
| Fair ticket pricing in public transport as a constrained cost allocation game | |
| Authors: | Borndoerfer, Ralf Hoang, Nam Dung |
| Keywords: | Constrained cost allocation games Fair ticket prices |
| Issue Date: | 2015 |
| Publisher: | SPRINGER, VAN GODEWIJCKSTRAAT 30, 3311 GZ DORDRECHT, NETHERLANDS |
| Citation: | ISIKNOWLEDGE |
| Abstract: | Ticket pricing in public transport usually takes a welfare maximization point of view. Such an approach, however, does not consider fairness in the sense that users of a shared infrastructure should pay for the costs that they generate. We propose an ansatz to determine fair ticket prices that combines concepts from cooperative game theory and linear and integer programming. The ticket pricing problem is considered to be a constrained cost allocation game, which is a generalization of cost allocation games that allows to deal with constraints on output prices and on the formation of coalitions. An application to pricing railway tickets for the intercity network of the Netherlands is presented. The results demonstrate that the fairness of prices can be improved substantially in this way. |
| Description: | ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH Volume: 226 Issue: 1 Pages: 51-68 Published: MAR 2015 ; TNS05752 |
| URI: | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10479-014-1698-z http://repository.vnu.edu.vn/handle/VNU_123/32372 |
| ISSN: | 0254-5330 |
| Appears in Collections: | Bài báo của ĐHQGHN trong Web of Science |
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